Red Diamond Russo-Ukraine Conflict assessment.

 With some caveats I personally assess these claims as true. 

Strategic observations include:

Winning LSCO requires effective conditions setting: Russia failed to set the conditions before launching operations, with inadequate preparation, sequencing, and exploitation.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and Air Dominance essential to LSCO:

Russia failed at SEAD, relegating its aerospace forces to launching standoff munitions from afar.

Extensive war stocks and secure supply chains needed to sustain LSCO:

Russia’s expenditure of precision standoff munitions combined with global sanctions necessitated its use of cross-domain fires.

LSCO requires rapid and scalable reconstitution and force generation plans:

Russia’s significant combat losses required extensive, repeated Battalion Tactical Group reconstitution efforts using Soviet-era equipment and indiscriminate manpower, such as pro-Russia separatist militias and Wagner professional military contractors, while Russia’s armed forces recruited, equipped, and deployed new “volunteer” battalions.

Effective command and control necessary for Multi-Domain Operations:

Russia is conducting operations in the land, sea, air, and cyber domains, but it has been unable to synchronize and scale integrated operations to date.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/operational-environment-and-threat-analysis-directorate/w/red-diamond-newsletters/38120/02-21st-century-large-scale-combat-operations-emergent-lessons-learned-from-russia-s-special-military-operation-in-ukraine-by-ian-kersey-tradoc-g-2/